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1Abstract
This paper presents three proposals intended to enhance liquidity in the market for U.S.
Treasury debt: making principal and interest STRIPS maturing on a common date fungible with
each other, aligning the maturity of 2-year debt with either bill maturities or the maturities of
longer-term debt, and establishing a facility to allow market participants to exchange (with the
Department of the Treasury) single-payment securities with similar, but not identical, maturities.
The proposals would enhance liquidity by improving the substitutability of identical and very
nearly identical Treasury liabilities, and by increasing the integration of the markets for bills,
notes, bonds and STRIPS.  The proposals would be complementary to, rather than a substitute
for, the initiative to buy back outstanding debt announced in August, 1999.
21. Introduction and Summary
The market for U.S. Treasury debt provides a highly liquid underpinning for the broader
markets in dollar-denominated fixed income securities.  However, liquidity in the Treasury market
has become an increasing concern as the federal government’s funding needs have lessened,
because - as shown in Figure 1 - trading is concentrated in recently issued, “on-the-run,”
securities.  Last August, the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) outlined a strategy to
maintain the supply of new notes and bonds by repurchasing off-the-run debt.1  T is paper
describes several additional, complementary, approaches to enhancing liquidity.
The first suggestion is to reduce fragmentation of trading in STRIPS by assigning the
same CUSIP number to all STRIPS maturing on a common date - thus making those STRIPS
fungible with each other.  In addition to enhancing the liquidity of the STRIPS market, this action
would ensure that STRIPS promising to pay the same amount on the same future date trade at the
same price, and it would enhance the internal integration of the market for notes and bonds as
well as the integration of that market with the STRIPS market.  More particularly, it would result
in very nearly identical market prices for identical cash flow streams, regardless of whether the
cash flows are derived from notes or bonds or portfolios of STRIPS.
We also suggest a re-examination of the structure of issue maturities, because
heterogeneity with respect to maturity date can fragment trading and reduce liquidity.  In
particular, we suggest eliminating end-of-month maturities for 2-year debt and integrating that
debt with either bills (by issuing 104-week bills on a quad-weekly basis) or longer-term notes and
bonds (by issuing 2-year notes with mid-month maturities on a monthly or quarterly basis).  It
would also be desirable to enhance the integration of bills with longer-term notes and bonds, but
aligning the maturity dates of those securities may be impractical.
The first two proposals can be viewed as extensions of steps taken previously by Treasury.
                                         
1 “U.S. May Buy Back Bonds to Trim Debt,” Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1999, p. A2 and
“Government Plans to Buy Back Bonds and Save Interest,” New York Times, August 5,
1999, p. A1.
3The third proposal, a facility to allow market participants to exchange (with Treasury) single-
payment securities with similar, but not identical, maturities, is a more adventurous approach to
enhancing liquidity.  The proposal would result in more similar prices for securities with similar,
but not identical, cash flows and would further integrate the markets for Treasury debt.  In
particular, it would materially enhance the integration of the markets for bills and coupon-bearing
notes and bonds.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 defines liquidity, identifies its determinants, and
comments on its benefits.  Section 3 describes how recent Treasury debt management practices
have promoted the goal of a liquid government securities market.  Section 4 presents our proposal
for the STRIPS program, Section 5 outlines two alternatives for reducing heterogeneity of issue
maturity dates, and Section 6 describes the exchange facility.  Section 7 concludes.
2. Liquidity and Asset Pricing
Asset pricing models commonly assume that markets are competitive and frictionless.
Continuous time versions of such markets are perfectly liquid: an investor can purchase or sell as
much as she wants at any time, instantaneously and at equilibrium prices.  Real markets, however,
are not perfectly liquid.  An investor has to pay for the service of immediate order execution (in
the form of a spread between the offer price at which she can buy and the bid price at which she
can sell),2 she faces wider spreads on larger orders, and if she chooses to search for a more
favorable transaction price she must bear the costs of search and the risks of delay.3
Securities traded in markets where bid-ask spreads are narrow and relatively insensitive to
the size of a transaction, where an acceptable counterparty can be located quickly and at low cost,
and where prices are not volatile, are said to more liquid than securities traded in markets where
                                         
2 Demsetz (1968) and Tanner and Kochin (1971).
3 Stigler (1961), Garbade and Silber (1976), Lippman and McCall (1986), and Amihud,
Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997).
4spreads are both wider and more sensitive to transaction size, search is costly and time-
consuming, and prices are volatile.  For example, short-term Treasury securities are more liquid
than longer term Treasury debt,4 bills are more liquid than short-term notes and bonds,5 larger
issues are more liquid than smaller issues,6 on-the-run securities are more liquid than seasoned
obligations,7 and, more generally, liquidity declines with the age of a security.8
Financial analysts concerned with minimizing capital costs have begun to pay more
attention to liquidity in the wake of a series of papers establishing a connection between liquidity
and asset pricing.9  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that the return on common stock listed
on the New York Stock Exchange is, inter alia, an increasing function of the bid-ask spread on
the stock.  Silber (1991) observes that companies issue unregistered stock (that can not be resold
in open market transactions for two years and that is relatively illiquid during that interval) at an
average discount of more than 30% relative to the price of registered, but otherwise identical,
stock.  Several authors, including Garbade (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1991a) and Kamara
(1994), point out the connection between (a) the yield spread between short-term Treasury notes
and Treasury bills and (b) the superior liquidity of bills compared to notes.  Warga (1992)
examines the premium return on seasoned Treasury notes and bonds compared to on-the-run
issues,10 and Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991, 1993) discuss the premium pricing of “benchmark”
                                         
4 Tanner and Kochin (1971), Garbade and Silber (1976), Garbade and Rosey (1977), and Elton
and Green (1998).
5 Garbade (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1991a), Kamara (1994), and Elton and Green
(1998).
6 Tanner and Kochin (1971), Garbade and Silber (1976), Garbade and Rosey (1977), Sarig and
Warga (1989), and Warga (1992).
7 Garbade and Silber (1976), Garbade and Rosey (1977), Sarig and Warga (1989), Warga
(1992), and Elton and Green (1998).
8 Warga (1992) and Elton and Green (1998).
9 See, generally, Amihud and Mendelson (1991b).
10 See also, Sarig and Warga (1989).
5bonds in the Japanese government bond market.  All of the papers conclude that liquidity is an
important determinant of asset pricing and that more liquid issues have higher prices and lower
returns.11
3. Liquidity and Treasury Debt Management
Minimizing the cost of funding the federal debt is a leading objective of Treasury debt
management policy.12  Since liquidity is an important determinant of borrowing costs, one could
imagine a funding program designed to maximize the liquidity of the securities issued.  In the most
extreme form, Treasury could finance any current deficit, and refinance maturing debt, with
frequent sales of large quantities of short-term bills.  This would concentrate Treasury
                                         
11 More recently, Elton and Green (1998) suggested that the effect of liquidity on the price of a
Treasury security is not as large as previously reported and is restricted to longer maturity
bonds with high trading volume, but those authors measured the liquidity of an issue by the
volume of trading in the inter-dealer market, rather than by the cost of transacting in the
public market.  Although the transactions costs of trading, e.g., a 6 month old 10-year note
are certainly higher than the transactions costs of trading the on-the-run 10-year note, the
ratio of transactions costs is not nearly as large as the reciprocal of the ratio of the volume of
trading in the two notes.  Dealers are willing to make fairly liquid markets for relatively
infrequent transactions in an old 10-year note because order flow and transaction prices in the
highly liquid and actively traded on-the-run 10-year note provide information on the value of
the off-the-run note, and because they can hedge much of their risk with the on-the-run note.
(Price and yield changes for an on-the-run note or bond are very highly correlated with price
and yield changes for other notes and bonds of a similar maturity and coupon rate.  Amihud,
Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997) present evidence on the existence of liquidity spillovers
across securities with highly correlated returns.)  Thus, there may not be any simple
relationship between the cost of liquidity for a particular Treasury security and the volume of
trading in the security.
12 In 1996, the Secretary of the Treasury remarked that, “The Treasury Department has through
its history focused on the most cost-effective ways to finance the federal debt.”  “Statement
of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Inflation Indexed Bonds Press Conference,” Tr asury
News, May 16, 1996.  The Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets recently characterized
“lowest cost financing” as one of the three main goals of Treasury debt management.  (He
described the other two as ensuring that adequate cash balances are available at all times and
promoting efficient capital markets.) Statement of Lee Sachs, Assistant Secretary, Financial
Markets, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Treasury’s Debt
Buyback Proposal (September 29, 1999).
6indebtedness in the most liquid sector of the market: large, short maturity, and unseasoned
discount obligations.
However, borrowing costs are affected by factors other than the liquidity of the securities
issued.  Most prominently, issuing exclusively in a narrow maturity sector might distort the shape
of the yield curve and lead to more than minimal overall funding costs, and Treasury has
historically chosen to issue at a variety of short, intermediate, and long maturities.13  This policy
has ancillary benefits: it provides market participants with regular new issues of “benchmark”
securities whose yields reflect the cost of credit for a default-proof borrower at a variety of
maturities,14 and it facilitates budget planning because it enhances the predictability of interest
expenses during a fiscal year and over longer intervals.
Issuing securities at maturities beyond the money market sector undoubtedly reduces to
some extent the liquidity of the Treasury market.  Longer maturity debt is inherently less liquid
than short-term debt, and a note or bond becomes more illiquid with the passage of time - as it
                                         
13 The Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets recently described “financing across the yield
curve” as one of five principles of Treasury debt management, observing that “A balanced
maturity structure enables us to appeal to the broadest range of investors and mitigates
refunding risks."  (The other four principles are maintenance of the credit risk-free status of
Treasury debt, predictable issuance schedules, maintenance of market liquidity, and unitary
financing of all Federal government programs.)  Statement of Lee Sachs, Assistant Secretary,
Financial Markets, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Treasury’s
Debt Buyback Proposal (September 29, 1999).
The sensitivity of Treasury to the effect of its debt management program on the shape of
the yield curve is illustrated by the statement (in May, 1993), of the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Domestic Finance that the shift to greater issuance of securities with maturities
of less than three years, the elimination of the 7-year note and the change from quarterly to
semi-annual issuance of 30-year bonds, “wasn’t intended to manipulate long-term interest
rates.”  “Treasury Slashes Sales of Long-Term Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1993, p.
C1.
14 Fleming (forthcoming) discusses the benchmark role of Treasury debt.  See also, “Quirk in
Yields is Making Bonds More Attractive,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1999, p. C1
(describing changes in market practices that followed the appearance of a substantial liquidity
premium in on-the-run Treasury securities in the fall of 1998).
7migrates from on-the-run to off-the-run status.15  Additionally, issuing longer term debt results in
a greater number of issues and a smaller average size per issue, further reducing liquidity.  These
adverse consequences are, however, outweighed by the advantages of diffusing issuance across
the curve.
Innovations in Debt Management
Financing the federal debt by issuing securities at a variety of maturities means that
Treasury has to choose the maturities at which it will issue, the amount to be issued at each
maturity, and the frequency of issue, e.g., weekly, monthly, or quarterly.  Treasury’s choices have
changed from time to time in light of evolving market conditions, the size of the deficit, and
refinancing requirements.
Treasury has adjusted its funding program several times during the past fifteen years with
the explicit objective of minimizing borrowing costs.  It cancelled the 20-year bond in April,
1986,16 the 4-year note in December, 1990,17 and the 7-year note in May, 1993,18 and it increased
                                         
15 The net effect of the passage of time (after an issue is no longer on the run) for the liquidity
of intermediate- and long-term securities is unclear.  We are unaware of any empirical
assessment of the relative liquidity of, say, a note that has been outstanding for 8 years but
has only 2 years remaining to maturity compared to a note that has been outstanding for only
2 years but has 8 years remaining to maturity.
16 In deciding to cancel the 20-year bond, Treasury concluded that “it would be more cost-
effective for the Treasury to issue larger amounts of 10- and 30-year securities rather than
20-year issues.” “Treasury Announces Elimination of 20-year Bond and Consideration of
Reduction in Savings Bonds Interest Rate,” Circular No. 10,030, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, May 2, 1986, and “Treasury Plans Note, Bond Sale of $27 Billion,” Wall Street
Journal, May 1, 1986, p. 44.  The Treasury yield curve had exhibited a persistent hump
between the 10-year sector and the 30-year sector, and Treasury decided it should stop
incurring the higher interest rates required to issue near the hump.  One market participant
also commented that “The 20-year issue seemed to be a bond without a natural home,” and
that it was “too long for investors who sought to reduce the risk of falling prices when
interest rates rise, but too short for other investors and speculators who want to earn the
highest possible profits by correctly guessing changes in interest rates.”  “U.S. Plans Its
Biggest Financing,” New York Times, May 1, 1986, p. D1.
17 The 4-year note was canceled when Treasury decided to reduce its reliance on bills and
8the frequency of issuing 5-year notes from quarterly to monthly in December, 1990.19
Although Treasury has, from time to time, adjusted its funding program for strategic
reasons, it has not usually varied the size of individual offerings tactically, in response to short-run
changes in investor demand for particular maturities.  For example, it has not attempted to benefit
systematically from unusually strong demand for bills maturing at the end of a calendar month,
quarter, or year, or for bills maturing immediately before a tax payment date, or for bills
deliverable on a futures contract.20  Ins ead, it has maintained fairly steady issue sizes and regular
                                                                                                                              
increase its use of intermediate-term debt.  Contemporaneously, Treasury moved the more
popular 5-year note cycle from quarterly to monthly.  “Treasury Announces Change in
Regular Quarterly Auction Cycles Beginning in 1991,” Treasury News, December 11, 1990.
18 Prior to 1993, the yield curve had not inverted significantly for any material length of time
since the early 1980s.  Treasury canceled the 7-year note after concluding that it could realize
long-term savings by shifting to shorter-term issues.  “Treasury Slashes Sales of Long-Term
Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1993, p. C1 and “Treasury Maturities Shortened,” New
York Times, May 6, 1993, p. D1.  In 1996, the Secretary of the Treasury observed that the
decision to cancel the 7-year note cycle “was initially looked on with some skepticism, but …
since has won considerable praise and is saving the taxpayers $7 billion.”  “Statement of
Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Inflation Indexed Bonds Press Conference,” T asury
News, May 16, 1996.
19 In May, 1998, Treasury reduced the frequency of issuing 5-year notes for reasons noted in
the text at footnote 30 below.
20 Premium pricing of bills deliverable on a futures contracts, or maturing at the end of a
calendar period or immediately before a tax payment date, is discussed in Garbade
(December, 1985), Simpson and Ireland (1985), Park and Reinganum (1986), and Ogden
(1987).  See also, “Seeing Signals from Investors on Year 2000: Treasury Bill Auction
Shows Concern on Risk,” New York Times, July 27, 1999, p. C1 (describing unusually strong
demand for bills maturing after the end of 1999).
In the course of the 1979 Treasury/Federal Reserve study of futures contracts on Treasury
securities, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and officers of commodity
exchanges that sponsored trading in futures contracts on Treasury securities asked “why, in
situations where a potential shortage of deliverable supply against a futures contract [on 3-
month bills] appeared to be creating a strong demand for the part of this supply that was
about to offered in a cash auction, would the Treasury not want to expand the size of the
auction and take advantage of what would likely be a relatively low borrowing cost?”
Department of theTr asury and Federal Reserve System (1979, Vol. II, pp. 83-84).  For
reasons discussed in the study (Vol. II, pp. 84 – 91), the study concluded that “having the
Treasury … act directly to modify potential squeezes on the deliverable supply of 3-month
bills … through a Treasury increase in the size of the new bill auction … is not acceptable.
9terms.21  One consequence of this policy is the tendency for exceptionally large bill issues -
including cash management issues and bills first issued as 52-week bills and then reopened as 26-
week bills and again as 13-week bills - to trade at higher yields compared to yields on nearby bills
with smaller outstanding issue sizes.22
Debt Management Practices Intended to Reduce Borrowing Costs by Enhancing Liquidity
Some features of Treasury debt management practices have been adopted with the specific
objective of reducing borrowing costs by enhancing the liquidity of Treasury securities. The most
prominent example is the modification of the 52-week bill cycle initiated in late 1979.
Up to and including the issue, on October 16, 1979, of the bill maturing October 14, 1980,
52-week bills were issued (once every four weeks) on a Tuesday and matured on a Tuesday.23  As
                                                                                                                              
While there may be occasions when the Treasury should add to the share of its marketable
debt represented by 3-month bills, such actions ought to be taken only as needed to
implement the Treasury’s general debt management objectives; they should not be initiated to
help resolve the particular needs of the commodity exchanges.” Department of the Treasury
and Federal Reserve System (1979, Vol. I, p. 26).
21 However, Treasury has reacted to unusual market situations at least three times since 1990.
The first was the reopening of the 6-3/8% note of August 15, 2002 (originally issued as a
10-year note in August, 1992) in the 10-year note auction in November, 1992.  In
announcing the reopening, Treasury stated that the reopening was intended to “alleviate an
acute, protracted shortage of [the] security.”  “Treasury November Quarterly Financing,”
Treasury press release dated November 3, 1992.
The second was the offering of a 30-1/4 year bond (the 7-1/2% bond of November 15,
2024) in the August, 1994 quarterly financing.  The four preceding issues of 30-year bonds
had increased the supply of STRIPS maturing in February and August (see Table 1 below),
and the unusual 30-1/4 year maturity was chosen to accommodate market demand for
STRIPS maturing in May and November.
The third was the decision to offer more 26-week bills than 13-week bills in the weekly
auctions from Monday, March 9, 1998 to Monday, September 14, 1998 as a result of
unusually strong foreign central bank demand for 26-week bills.  See “U.S. Sets Uneven Split
in Coming T-Bill Sale to Maintain Liquidity,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1998, p. C21.
22 Simon (1991, 1994).
23 This 52-week bill cycle was adopted in the summer of 1972, when Treasury switched from
the previous practice (adopted in August, 1963) of monthly auctions of 1-year bills issued at
the end of a month and maturing at the end of a month - similar to the current 2-year note
10
a result, 52-week bills were not fungible with subsequent issues of 26-week and 13-week bills
(which matured on Thursdays).24  On November 1, 1979, Treasury announced that 52-week bills
would henceforth mature on a Thursday and that they would be fungible with subsequent issues of
26-week bills and 13-week bills with the same maturity date.25  Treasury stated that the change
would “reduce the number of separate bills outstanding … and improve liquidity [emphasis
added] for the 52-week bills.” 26
Similarly, Treasury has taken advantage of opportunities to reopen outstanding notes and
bonds in lieu of issuing new securities.  The most important and frequent examples are reopenings
of the most recently auctioned 10-year note and 30-year bond.27  Table 1 shows new issues and
                                                                                                                              
cycle.  Treasury Bulletin, July, 1963, p. A-1, September, 1963, pp. A-4 and A-5, and
September, 1972, p. II.
24 26-week bills were first auctioned in December, 1958 and, from inception, were fungible with
subsequent issues of 13-week bills.  Treasury Bulletin,  December, 1958, p. A-2, and
January, 1959, p. A-2.
25 The first bill issued under the new procedure was the 359-day bill issued Tuesday, November
13, 1979 to mature Thursday, November 6, 1980.  That bill was issued on a Tuesday to
refinance an old 52-week bill maturing on the same date.  The last 359-day bill was issued
Tuesday, October 14, 1980 - to mature on Thursday, October 8, 1981 - to refinance the last
of the 52-week bills with a Tuesday maturity date.  The first 52-week with a Thursday issue
date as well as a Thursday maturity date was the November 5, 1981 bill issued November 6,
1980.  Treasury Bulletin, June, 1980, p. 28, and June, 1981, p. 33.
In June, 1981, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange amended the delivery provisions on its
13-week Treasury bill futures contract to provide that, beginning with the contract settling in
June, 1983, the deliverable bill would be an old 52-week bill with 13 weeks remaining to
maturity.  “90-day U.S. Treasury Bill Amendment Approved by CFTC,” Special Executive
Report S-848, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, June 2, 1981.  The change reduced the
likelihood of a squeeze or corner in the bill contract; an issue discussed in Department of the
Treasury and Federal Reserve System (1979, Vol. I, pp. 13-14 and Vol. II, pp. 66 - 72.).  See
also, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1981, Pt. 3, pp. 56 - 61) for an analysis of
Treasury bill prices prior to the June, 1979 settlement of the 13-week bill contract on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
26 Treasury Bulletin, November, 1979, p. VII.
27 On one occasion, Treasury reopened a 30-year bond that was not the most recently issued
bond in the series.  In the February, 1988 quarterly financing, Treasury reopened the 8-3/4%
bond of May 15, 2017 that had been issued on May 15, 1987 and that had 29-1/4 years
remaining to maturity.  The most recently auctioned 30-year bond at the time of the February,
11
reopenings of those securities over the past decade.
Additionally, Treasury has reopened an old 5-year note in a shorter-term cycle on three
occasions:
· in May, 1988, the 8-1/2% note of May 15, 1991 (issued as a 5-year note on March 5,
1986) was reopened as a 3-year note,
· in October, 1994, the 6-7/8% note of October 31, 1996 (issued as a 5-year note on
October 31, 1991) was reopened as a 2-year note, and
· in February, 1996, the 5-1/8% note of February 28, 1998 (issued as a 5-year note on
March 1, 1993) was reopened as a 2-year note.
Treasury also stated that it was prepared to reopen an old 5-year note in the 2-year note auctions
in April, July, September and October, 1995.28
During 1998, Treasury altered its debt management practices on two occasions to
maintain the liquidity of Treasury securities.  In early March it announced that, contrary to past
practice, it would offer a larger face amount of 26-week bills than 13-week bills in the auctions to
be held on Monday, March 9.  The change was in response to strong demand for 26-week bills
from foreign central banks and the desire to insure that sufficient bills reached the hands of
                                                                                                                              
1988 financing was the 8-7/8% bond of August 15, 2017 that had been issued on August 17,
1987 and reissued on November 16, 1987.
28 Notes and bonds issued before July, 1984 could not be reopened after that date because of
changes in the treatment of market discount and the 30% foreign withholding tax mandated
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984.  “Questions and Answers on STRIPS,” p. 6, an addendum
to “Treasury Announces New STRIPS Program,” T easury News, January 15, 1985.  On
several occasions, including the auctions of 5-year notes in May and November, 1988 and
May, 1989, and the auction of 10-year notes in August, 1991, Treasury was consequently
unable to reopen an old bond in a note auction.  To minimize the possibility of confusion,
Treasury announced prior to each auction that, regardless of auction results, it would not
issue the new note with the same coupon rate as the coupon rate on the old bond with the
same maturity date.  See, for example, “Treasury August Quarterly Refunding,” Treasury
press release dated July 31, 1991 (noting that, “If, under Treasury’s usual auction
procedures, the auction of 10-year notes results in the same interest rate as on the
outstanding 8% bonds of August 15, 2001, the new notes will be issued with either a 7-7/8%
or an 8-1/8% coupon.”).
12
domestic investors.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance characterized the change
as “an effort to maintain liquidity [emphasis added] in the market.” 29  Treasury continued to
offer unequal amounts of 13- and 26-week bills until the auction of Monday, September 21, 1998.
In May, 1998, Treasury announced that the 3-year note cycle would be eliminated and that
those notes would be replaced in the quarterly financings by 5-year notes.30 The cti n was taken
in response to substantial budget surpluses and to avoid reducing the issue sizes of 2-, 5- and 10-
year notes and 30-year bonds out of concern that smaller issues would be less liquid.  The
Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets remarked that, “We chose to concentrate on having
fewer, larger, issues.” 31
Initiatives Undertaken to Reduce Borrowing Costs that May Have Adversely Affected the
Liquidity of Conventional Notes and Bonds
Although Treasury has shown great sensitivity to the importance of maintaining and
enhancing the liquidity of Treasury securities, it has sometimes undertaken initiatives intended to
reduce borrowing costs that may have affected liquidity adversely.  These initiatives reflect the
principle, noted in the beginning of this section, that liquidity is only one factor affecting
borrowing costs and that, in some cases, it can be outweighed by other considerations.32
                                         
29 “U.S. Sets Uneven Split in Coming T-Bill Sale to Maintain Liquidity,” Wall S reet Journal,
March 4, 1998, p. C21.
30 The monthly cycle of 5-year notes was cancelled at the same time.
31 “It’s Two Steps Back for Short-term Tr asurys,” New York Times, May 7, 1998, p. C1.  The
Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets observed that Treasury decided to stop issuing 3-
year notes because the continuing issues of 2-year notes and 5-year notes would offer similar
investment opportunities, and because the 10-year note and 30-year bond series “provide a
critical service to overall capital markets that would be hard for anybody else to fill.”  See
also, “Bonds Stay Put as Traders Wait for Jobs Report; Fannie Mae to Offer Additional
Benchmark Bonds,” Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1998, p. C25 (noting that “drastically
reducing the … amount of [Treasury] securities sold [in a single auction] … would likely hurt
liquidity in the issues.”).
32 This characterization is consistent with the recent statement of the Assistant Secretary for
Financial Markets that minimizing borrowing costs is one of three “goals” of Treasury debt
13
Treasury introduced novel securities intended to appeal to investors with specialized
interests on two occasions.  Between 1984 and 1986 it sold a total of four Foreign-Targeted
Treasury Notes,33 and in January, 1997 it introduced Inflation-Indexed Securities.  (Table 2 shows
details on the offerings of Inflation-Indexed Securities.)  Both programs were undertaken with the
intent of reducing borrowing costs by issuing securities tailored to exploit specific market
niches.34  However, both programs also led to issuing securities that turned out to be materially
less liquid than conventional Treasury issues,35 and both led to reduced issuance of conventional
                                                                                                                              
management (the other two goals are noted in footnote 12), while maintenance of market
liquidity is one of five “guiding principles” (the other four principles are noted in footnote
13).  Statement of Lee Sachs, Assistant Secretary, Financial Markets, before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Treasury’s Debt Buyback Proposal (September
29, 1999).
33 The four issues were the Foreign-Targeted 11-3/8% 4-year note of September 30, 1988
(issued October 31, 1984), the Foreign-Targeted 11% 5-year note of February 15, 1990
(issued December 3, 1984), the Foreign-Targeted 9-7/8% 5-year note of August 15, 1990
(issued June 4, 1985), and the Foreign-Targeted 8-7/8% 10-year note of February 15, 1996
(issued February 18, 1986).
34 Foreign-Targeted notes were sold only to United States Aliens or foreign branches of United
States financial institutions.  See, for example, Foreign-Targeted Treasury Notes of
September 30, 1988, Offering Circular dated October 10, 1984, Public Debt Series No. 31-
84, Department of the Treasury.  The notes were intended to appeal to nonresident aliens and
foreign corporations that did not care to own Treasury securities in a conventionally
registered form.
In announcing the intent of Treasury to issue Inflation-Indexed Securities, the Secretary of
the Treasury cited the potential contribution of the new asset class to reducing the cost of
funding the federal debt, and noted the belief of the Department that the securities would be
most attractive to individuals saving for their retirement or other long term purposes.
“Statement of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Inflation Indexed Bonds Press
Conference,” Treasury News, May 16, 1996.
35 The limited liquidity of the Foreign-Targeted notes was mitigated by the convertibility of each
of the notes into a conventional note with the same coupon rate and maturity date.  See, for
example, Foreign-Targeted Treasury Notes of September 30, 1988, Offering Circular dated
October 10, 1984, Public Debt Series No. 31-84, Department of the Treasury and Garbade
(January, 1985).
Market participants made active use of the conversion option.  For example, in February,
1986, Treasury issued $1 billion of the Foreign-Targeted 8-7/8% 10-year note of February
15, 1996 and $7.5 billion of the conventional 8-7/8% note maturing on the same date
14
notes and bonds, and thus reduced the liquidity of the markets for those securities.36
The STRIPS Program.  Similar comments apply to the STRIPS program, introduced in
early 1985, that provided for the separation of the interest and principal payments on a note or
bond into single-payment, or “zero-coupon,” obligations.
The new obligations were patterned on private sector zero-coupon custodial receipts that
had appeared in August, 1982.37  The statement announcing the STRIPS program observed that,
“Zero-coupon securities … have become very popular for those who wish to avoid reinvestment
risk or seek greater certainty in matching the maturities of their assets and liabilities.  They have
been particularly attractive investments for Individual Retirement Accounts and pension funds,”
and noted that the private receipts had “broadened the market for Treasury securities” and
produced “significant savings in financing costs.” 38  The statement further remarked that
“STRIPS will greatly reduce … financing costs … and facilitate further expansion of the zero-
                                                                                                                              
(Treasury Bulletin, Spring, 1986, p. 28).  By March 31, 1986, $217 million of the Foreign-
Targeted note had been converted into the conventional note (Treasury Bulletin, Spring,
1986, p. 23).  By the end of 1986, the outstanding amount of the Foreign-Targeted note was
down to $188 million (Treasury Bulletin, Winter, 1987, p. 28), and by the end of 1995 the
outstanding amount of the Foreign-Targeted note was only $125 million (Treasury Bulletin,
March, 1996, p. 35).
36 Only $4 billion of Foreign-Targeted notes were issued, and all were issued at a time of large
budget deficits, so the impact on the liquidity of other Treasury securities was likely de
minimis.  In contrast, over $97 billion of Inflation-Indexed Securities have been issued
through the end of 1999, at a time of significant surpluses and substantial net redemptions of
conventional Treasury debt.
37 The first private sector receipt programs included Certificates of Accrual on Treasury
Securities (“CATS”) introduced by Salomon Bothers Inc., Treasury Investment Growth
Receipts (“TIGR’s”) introduced by Merrill Lynch White Weld Capital Markets Group, and
Zero Coupon Treasury Obligations, introduced by Lehman Government Securities, Inc.
These “private-label” programs were later joined by Treasury Receipts (TRs”), a generic, or
open, receipt program initially sponsored by Goldman, Sachs & Company and the First
Boston Corporation.  “Zero Coupon Selling Revised, Dealers Seek One Receipt,” New York
Times, January 10, 1984, p. D7.
38 “Treasury Announces New STRIPS Program,” Treasury News, January 15, 1985.
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coupon market.  The savings made possible by STRIPS will be reflected in the competitive
bidding for Treasury securities.” 39 At the same time, however, stripping led to the creation of
relatively less liquid single-payment Interest Component STRIPS and Principal Component
STRIPS, and may have reduced the liquidity of underlying notes and bonds by reducing the
outstanding stocks of those securities.40
Two Innovations that Mitigated the Impact of the STRIPS Program on the Liquidity of
Conventional Notes and Bonds.  Two subsequent modifications to the STRIPS program
mitigated whatever adverse impact that program may have had on the liquidity of the Treasury
market.
Effective July 29, 1985, all Interest Component STRIPS payable on a common date were
assigned a common CUSIP number and became fungible with each other.  Under the original
program, Interest Component STRIPS payable on a common date had different CUSIPs (and,
therefore, were not fungible) if they were derived from securities with different CUSIPs.  Th
                                         
39 Treasury modified its issuance practices to enhance stripping-based auction demand for 10-
year notes and 30-year bonds by issuing the securities with a full first coupon (and positive
accrued interest) when the issue date did not fall on a semi-annual anniversary date.  The first
securities issued with positive accrued interest were the 9-1/2% note of November 15, 1995
and the 9-7/8% bond of November 15, 2015, sold in the November, 1985 quarterly financing.
Both securities were issued November 29, 1985, but both were dated November 15, 1985.
The modification was important because the STRIPS program provided that a security could
not be stripped if it had an unpaid short or long first coupon.  (This restriction delayed
stripping a 20-year bond until the bond paid its first coupon.  For example, the 10-3/4% bond
of August 15, 2005 was issued on July 2, 1985, but did not become eligible for the STRIPS
program until a few days after it paid its (long) first coupon on February 15, 1986.)
To accommodate market demand for long-term STRIPS and further enhance stripping-
based demand for new issues of 30-year bonds, Treasury also eliminated the call option that
had heretofore been embedded in those bonds.  “Treasury Announces New STRIPS
Program,” Treasury News, January 15, 1985.
40 However, STRIPS proved to be far more liquid than private sector custodial receipts,
because private sector receipts payable on a common date were fragmented by sponsor and
series, and because private sector receipts were not direct obligations of the U.S. government
and were not eligible for book-entry accounts at Federal Reserve banks.
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statement announcing the change noted that it would “further increase the liquidity [emphasis
added] of the STRIPS program … thereby reducing transactions costs and at the same time
broadening the marketability of STRIPS.” 41
The second modification became effective May 1, 1987, and provided that Principal
Component STRIPS could be “reconstituted” with Interest Component STRIPS into the notes or
bonds from which they were derived. The statement announcing the change observed that the new
facility would “enhance the … liquidity [emphasis added] … of Treasury securities.” 42
Remaining Limitations on the Fungibility of All STRIPS Maturing on a Common
Date.  Although the STRIPS program has, since July, 1985, provided for fungibility of Interest
Component STRIPS maturing on a common date, it has not provided for comparable fungibility
of Principal Component STRIPS derived from different coupon-bearing securities maturing on the
same date, or of Interest Component STRIPS and Principle Component STRIPS maturing on a
common date.
As illustrated in Table 3, this has resulted in numerous cases of pairs of STRIPS - and four
cases of triplets of STRIPS - trading at different prices and yields, even though they mature on the
same future date.43  It is not unreasonable to assume that fragmentation of trading in STRIPS with
identical payment characteristics has led to higher transactions costs and lower liquidity than
would otherwise be the case.44
                                         
41 “Treasury Announces Change to Generic CUSIPs for STRIPS,” Treasury News, June 14,
1985.
42 “Treasury Announces Date for Reconstitution of Securities in STRIPS Program,” Treasury
News, March 31, 1987.  Reconstitution would have been much more difficult in the absence
of the provision for fungibility of Interest Component STRIPS maturing on a common date.
43 Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) examine why Interest Component STRIPS and Principal
Components STRIPS maturing on the same date trade at different yields.
44 Grieves and Sunner (1999) emphasize the importance of fungiblity of STRIPS maturing on a
common date for market liquidity.
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4. A Proposal to Reduce Heterogeneity in the STRIPS Market
Our first proposal is to reduce the fragmentation, and enhance the liquidity, of trading in
STRIPS by eliminating distinctions among Principal Component STRIPS derived from different
coupon-bearing securities maturing on the same date, as well as the distinction between Principal
Component STRIPS and Interest Component STRIPS paying on the same date.  In particular, we
propose that all STRIPS maturing on a common date should be fungible with each other and
should be assigned a common CUSIP number.
Figure 2 shows STRIP yields on October 6, 1999.  The dispersion of yields on STRIPS
maturing on common dates is evident.  By eliminating distinctions among STRIPS other than
maturity date, the proposal would collapse STRIP yields onto a single curve of yield as a function
of time to payment, and would thereby enhance the integration of the STRIPS market.
Because notes and bonds can be stripped quickly and at little cost, and because STRIPS
can be similarly reconstituted into notes and bonds, arbitrage keeps the price of a note or bond
very nearly equal to the sum of the prices of its component STRIPS.45  Our proposal to reduce
heterogeneity in the STRIPS market would thus result in very nearly identical market prices for
identical cash flow streams - regardless of whether the cash flows are derived from portfolios of
notes and bonds or from portfolios of STRIPS promising to make the same future payments - and
would thereby enhance the integration of the market for notes and bonds as well as the integration
of that market with the STRIPS market.
Recent Characteristics of Note and Bond Market Integration
The implication of our proposal for the integration of the market for notes and bonds is
especially significant in light of evidence that the internal cohesion of that market deteriorated in
the fall of 1998 and has not subsequently recovered.
                                         
45 Transactions costs incurred in purchasing and selling STRIPS and coupon-bearing securities
prevent arbitrage from keeping the price of a note or bond identically equal to the sum of the
prices of its component STRIPS.
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Figure 3 shows yields on coupon-bearing securities on October 6, 1999 as a function of
time to maturity.  There is no reason to expect the yields to lie on a curve, because yield can vary
with coupon rate as well as with time to maturity.
However, we might expect that, at least to a first approximation, the market prices the
individual payments on notes and bonds from a common “spot,” or single-payment, yield curve,
so the price of a portfolio of cash flows does not depend on the particular notes and bonds used
to construct the portfolio.  To examine this proposition, a cubic spline approximation to a spot
yield curve pricing the underlying cash flows was fitted to the note and bond prices observed on
October 6, 1999,46 and the predicted prices were converted to yields.  The median absolute
difference between model yields and market yields was 1.9 basis points.  This is a measure of the
dispersion of the difference between the market values of the notes and bonds and the aggregate
present values of the constituent future payments discounted with the fitted spot yield curve.
Figure 4 shows similar measures over the interval from July 1, 1993 to October 6, 1999.
The increase in the median absolute difference in the fall of 1998, and the absence of any
subsequent reversal, is evident.  Since our proposal would result in very nearly identical market
prices for identical cash flows, it would greatly reduce the median absolute difference between
market yields and the yields computed from a spot yield curve fitted to yields on STRIPS, and it
would thereby help to reverse the increase in yield dispersion in the note and bond market.
Elasticity in the Supply of Individual Notes and Bonds
A second significant implication of our proposal is that when there is unusually strong
demand for a security, market participants could use the reconstitution facility to create more of
the security than Treasury originally issued. The proposal would not permit market participants to
alter Treasury’s aggregate liabilities on any future date, including both interest liabilities and
principal liabilities, but it would allow market participants to alter the pack ging of the liabilities.
                                         
46 Fleming (forthcoming) describes the methodology in detail.
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For example, as illustrated in Example 1, the market could convert a higher coupon security into
STRIPS and a lower coupon security.
The decision of market participants to buy and strip a relatively cheap security, add or
remove some STRIPS, and then reconstitute and sell a relatively expensive security, is not
undesirable, because (as described above) it would keep the prices and yields of outstanding notes
and bonds in line with each other.  In particular, it would provide a mechanism for expanding the
supply of a security “on special” in the financing market for specific collateral 47 and,
consequently, expensive in the cash market.48  It would provide a “relief valve,” not unlike the
delivery options specified in futures contracts,49 and would limit the prospect of squeezes and
corners.50
Figure 5 illustrates (on a cash flow basis) how much non-callable Treasury debt with mid-
quarter maturities has been stripped and how much more could be stripped.  Table 4 shows (on a
principal basis) the outstanding amounts and the maximum additional amounts that could be
created by reconstituting STRIPS derived from other securities  The amounts are substantial,
suggesting that “uncapping” the reconstitution feature could have a material impact on relative
issue supplies and prices.  However, as shown in Table 4, the potential addition to supply would
be smaller the more distant the maturity date of a security, because there are fewer other cash
                                         
47 Duffie (1996) and Jordan and Jordan (1997) describe and characterize the financing market
for specific collateral.
48 It would, therefore, supplement the mid-1998 changes in the management of the System
Open Market Account intended to “enhance liquidity in the financing market.” Letter dated
June 16, 1998 from Peter Fisher, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to Primary Dealers.
49 Delivery options on futures contracts are discussed in Pa l, Kahl and Tomek (1981, pp. 110 -
112), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (1981, pp. 98 - 117), Kilcollin (1982),
Garbade and Silber (1983), Gay and Manaster (1984, 1986), Kane and Marcus (1986), Arak
and Goodman (1987), Kamara and Siegel (1987), Boyle (1989), and Manaster (1992).
50 The potential contribution of eliminating distinctions among STRIPS maturing on a common
date to alleviating squeezes is examined in Department of the Treasury et. al., (1992, pp. B11
- B16).
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flows available to expand the supply of a longer dated bond.  In particular, the supply of the bond
with the most distant maturity date would be limited to the amount issued.
Tax Implications
Conversion of higher coupon notes and bonds into STRIPS and lower coupon notes and
bonds, as illustrated in Example 1, could lead to lower Treasury tax receipts on interest income.
Assessing the magnitude of this effect is beyond the scope of the present paper.  However, we
observe that what is important is the net effect on Treasury tax revenues, including:
· foregone taxes on interest income from the higher coupon securities converted into
lower coupon securities and STRIPS,
· increased taxes on the interest income from the lower coupon securities created by
conversion,
· increased taxes on the annual accretions of discount on the STRIPS created by
conversion, as well as
· the tax consequences of any capital gains or losses associated with the sale (for
conversion) and conversion of higher coupon securities into lower coupon securities
and STRIPS.
Among other things, the magnitudes of these tax effects depend on the tax brackets of the
investors who sell and convert higher coupon debt, and the tax brackets of the investors who
acquire the lower coupon debt and STRIPS created by conversion.51
                                         
51 A similar issue arises in the context of Treasury’s proposal to repurchase off-the-run
securities (see footnote 1).  To the extent Treasury elects to repurchase securities with high
coupon rates trading at prices in excess of principal value (to maintain issuance of new debt
with current coupon rates and prices close to principal value), tax revenues on interest
income could decline.  However, as with the conversion of high coupon debt into low coupon
debt that could result from our proposal, the magnitude of any such effect will depend on the
tax brackets of the investors selling the high coupon debt and the tax brackets of the investors
buying the new (current coupon) debt, as well as any offsetting tax revenues derived from
capital gains on the sale of the high coupon debt.
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Capping the Amount of a Note or Bond That Can be Reconstituted
To limit any prospective loss of Treasury tax revenue, it would not be unreasonable to
“cap” the amount of a note or bond that could be reconstituted.  The cap could be set at the
original issue size of the security (including any reopenings), less the currently outstanding stock
of the security, plus an additional amount that could vary from security to security.  The
additional amount could, for example, be relatively generous for an issue priced substantially
above its principal value, and smaller for an issue priced at a material discount.  Similarly, it could
vary over time as market yields rise and fall.
Such a cap would not materially vitiate any of the benefits of the proposal related to
fungibility and liquidity.  However, it would allow the possibility of a note or bond becoming
more expensive than the sum of the prices of the STRIPS that can be derived from the security.
This would happen if reconstitution had expanded the supply of the security to its original issue
size plus the additional amount prescribed by Treasury, so that no additional supplies could be
created through further reconstitution in spite of the economic incentive.
5. A Proposal to Reduce Maturity Date Heterogeneity
The proposal presented in the preceding section was premised on the notion that
fragmentation of trading in STRIPS with identical payment characteristics degrades liquidity,
reduces the attractiveness of Treasury securities, and increases the cost of funding the federal
debt.52  Liquidity can also be degraded by fragmentation of trading in securities with
heterogeneous payment characteristics.  We observed in Section 3 that Treasury has reduced the
heterogeneity, and enhanced the liquidity, of its debt during the past 20 years by integrating 52-
week bills with 26- and 13-week bills, by reopening outstanding notes and bonds whenever
                                         
52 Treasury recognized explicitly that fragmentation of trading in Interest Component STRIPS
with identical payment characteristics degrades liquidity and reduces the attractiveness of
those STRIPS and, in mid-1985, acted to eliminate that fragmentation.  See text at footnote
41.
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possible, and - as illustrated in Table 5 - by pruning selected offerings, including 3-year, 4-year
and 7-year notes and 20-year bonds.53
Currently, bills mature on Thursdays, 2-year notes mature at month-end, and 5-year and
10-year notes and 30-year bonds mature at mid-quarter.  Further simplification would be
welcome.
One possibility is to alter the maturity of 2-year notes to mid-month.  In combination with
our proposal to reduce heterogeneity in the STRIPS market, this would increase the integration of
2-year notes maturing in the middle of the second month of each quarter with old 5-year and 10-
year notes and 30-year bonds maturing on the same dates.  In some cases it may be possible to
reopen a seasoned security in the 2-year note auction in the second month of a quarter.54
However, unless the frequency of 2-year issuance is reduced to once a quarter, the reduction in
heterogeneity would be limited because there would still be cycles of 2-year notes maturing in the
middle of the first month and the third month of each quarter.
Alternatively, Treasury could integrate the 2-year debt program with the bill program,
paralleling the change from monthly offerings of 1-year bills to quad-weekly offerings of 52-week
bills maturing on Thursday.55  In particular, Treasury could replace its monthly offerings of 2-year
notes with quad-weekly offerings of 104-week bills.  The cycle of 104-week bills could be timed
so the maturity dates of the bills fall midway between the maturity dates of subsequent offerings
of 52-week bills.56
                                         
53 Eliminating 7-year notes also eliminated an odd cycle of notes maturing in the middle of the
first month of each quarter.
54 This would be similar to the reopenings described in the text at footnote 28.
55 As noted in footnote 25 and in the text at footnotes 23, 24 and 25, the integration of 1-year
bills with 26- and 13-week bills was accomplished in two separate steps, in 1972 and in 1979-
80.
56 For example, on January 22, 1998, Treasury could have issued a 104-week bill maturing on
January 20, 2000.  That bill would mature midway between the maturity dates of two
subsequent issues of 52-week bills: the January 6, 2000 bill (issued on January 7, 1999) and
the February 3, 2000 bill (issued on February 4, 1999).
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Integrating Bills with Notes and Bonds
Closer integration of the 2-year debt program with either the bill program or the longer-
term note and bond program would reduce fragmentation and enhance liquidity, but the benefits
of integrating bills with notes and bonds are, potentially, far greater.
Figure 6 shows that outstanding stocks of bills and short-term notes and bonds are of
roughly similar magnitude.  However, bills are priced quite differently from coupon-bearing
securities maturing only a few days earlier or later, or even on the same day.  This is illustrated by
the yield spreads of 20 to 30 basis points between bills and short-term notes and bonds shown in
Figure 7.  The greater value (lower yield) of bills is commonly attributed to the greater liquidity of
those securities compared to notes and bonds of a similar maturity.57  Closer in egration of the
two classes of securities could materially enhance the liquidity (and market value) of the latter
securities.  The prospect of improved liquidity and higher prices in the market for short-term
coupon-bearing securities would, in turn, enhance the liquidity and value of intermediate-term
securities and consequently lower the cost of funding the federal debt.
However, integrating bills and coupon-bearing securities more closely would appear to
require that coupon payments be changed from intervals of 6 calendar months to intervals of 182
days.  This would create unusual maturity sequences - 5-year and 10-year notes and 30-year
bonds would mature every 91 days, rather than every 3 calendar months - and would constitute a
significant departure from present practice.  In short, while 2-year debt can be integrated with bills
(by converting monthly issues of 2-year notes to quad-weekly issues of 104-week bills) or with
longer-term notes and bonds (by converting 2-year notes to mid-month maturities), directly
integrating bills and coupon-bearing securities may be impractical.
In view of the substantial benefits that would follow from closer integration, it is worth
examining an indirect approach to integrating the bill program with the note and bond program.
The next section describes how the markets for bills and coupon-bearing securities could be more
                                         
57 Garbade (1984), Amihud and Mendelson (1991a), and Kamara (1994).
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closely integrated - without departing from present issuance practices - as an ancillary
consequence of a facility designed to enhance further the liquidity of the markets for notes, bonds
and STRIPS.
6. A Third, More Adventurous, Proposal to Enhance Liquidity
The contrast between yields on bills and yields on short-term notes and bonds shows that
Treasury securities with similar payment characteristics, but in different classes, may be priced
quite differently by market participants.  Minor differences in security characteristics can also lead
to anomalous yield structures within a security class.
For example, on July 22, 1999, Treasury bills maturing on September 23, September 30,
and October 7, 1999, were offered at yields of 4.48%, 4.43% and 4.51%, respectively.  The 5
basis point decline in yield from the September 23 bill to the September 30 bill, and the relatively
sharp 8 basis point increase in yield from the September 30 bill to the October 7 bill, are notable
for a maturity sector where (as shown in Table 6) the bill yield curve generally had a mildly
positive slope.58
On the same date, Interest Component STRIPS maturing on August 15 and November 15,
2006, and on February 15, 2007, were offered at yields of 5.99%, 5.96% and 6.02%, respectively.
The 3 basis point decline in yield from the August, 2006 obligation to the November, 2006
obligation, and the more-than-off-setting 6 basis point increase in yield from the November, 2006
obligation to the February, 2007 obligation, are notable in a market where (as shown in Table 3)
the yield curve for Interest Component STRIPS maturing between 2005 and 2010 was
moderately positively sloped.
The proposal outlined in Section 4 would enhance the liquidity of the Treasury market by
making STRIPS with identical maturities perfect substitutes.  Liquidity can be further enhanced
                                         
58 The September 30 bill was an end-of-quarter bill as well as an end-of-month bill. Garbade
(December, 1985), Park and Reinganum (1986), and Ogden (1987) discuss the premium
pricing of such bills.
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by improving the substitutability of single-payment securities (including both STRIPS and
Treasury bills) with similar, but not identical, maturities.  In particular, while Treasury can not -
and, indeed, should not - make STRIPS maturing in August and November, 2006 and in
February, 2007 perfect substitutes for each other (in the sense of ensuring that they always trade
at fixed yield spreads), it can make the securities better substitutes by permitting some elasticity in
relative supplies that would reduce the prospect of more extreme variations in the relationships
among the yields on the three securities.
The Proposal
Our third proposal is for an “exchange facility” that would allow market participants to
exchange - with Treasury - two single-payment securities (with very similar maturities and with
face values of $1,000 each) for a single-payment security with an intermediate maturity and a
$2,000 face value, and vice versa.
Suppose, for example, a November, 2006 STRIP is expensive relative to the August, 2006
and February, 2007 STRIPS - as was the case with Interest Component STRIPS on July 22, 1999
(see Table 3).  Market participants could then exchange $1,000 face amount of each of the
cheaper STRIPS for $2,000 face amount of the more expensive November, 2006 STRIP.
Conversely, if the November, 2006 STRIP was relatively cheap, market participants could
exchange $2,000 face amount of that security for $1,000 face amount each of the August, 2006
and February, 2007 STRIPS.
As described in more detail below, the exchange facility would bound very short-range
irregularities in the structure of yields on single-payment securities, but it should be structured to
avoid influencing the over-all level and shape of the yield curve.  To preclude any effects on the
curve, we suggest that Treasury impose a fee on exchanges and limit exchanges to “nearby”
securities.59
                                         
59 Left in the simple form described in the preceding paragraph, the exchange facility would
result in an equilibrium where the price of any single-payment security would be equal to the
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An Exchange Fee.  We suggest that Treasury impose a fee - specified in terms of yield
and amounting to several, perhaps 2 or 3, basis points - on an exchange of single-payment
securities.  For purposes of computing the fee in dollar terms, the shorter and longer securities
involved in an exchange would be valued at prevailing market yields.  The intermediate security
would be valued at the average, or interpolated, yield on the shorter and longer securities, plus or
minus the prescribed fee.
Suppose, for example, the exchange fee is set at 2-1/2 basis points.  For illustrative
purposes, let us use the yields on Interest Component STRIPS on July 22, 1999 from Table 3 and
a settlement date of July 23, 1999.   Since the average yield on the August, 2006 and February,
2007 STRIPS was 6.005% (6.005% is the average of 5.99% and 6.02%), a market participant
could exchange $1,000 face amount of each of those STRIPS (priced at their respective market
yields) for $2,000 face amount of November, 2006 STRIPS priced at a yield of 5.98% (5.98% =
6.005%, less the 2-1/2 basis point exchange fee).  As shown in Example 2, this would result in a
cash payment to Treasury of $2.27.
Alternatively, a market participant could exchange $2,000 face amount of November,
2006 STRIPS priced at a yield of 6.03% (6.03% = 6.005%, plus the 2-1/2 basis point exchange
fee) for $1,000 face amount of August, 2006 STRIPS and the same face amount of February,
2007 STRIPS (priced at their respective market yields).  As shown in Example 3, this would
result in a cash payment to Treasury of $2.34.60
Appendix A discusses whether the size of the cash payment to Treasury resulting from an
exchange is sensitive to the yields used to value the obligations exchanged.  We conclude that the
size of the payment is relatively insensitive to modest variations in both the levels of the yields and
                                                                                                                              
average price of a pair of shorter and longer term single-payment securities.  If positive
amounts of single-payment securities of all maturities remained outstanding, the price of a
single-payment security would be a linear function of its time to maturity.
60 The payment to Treasury is slightly larger for the exchange of the intermediate STRIP into
the shorter and longer STRIPS, because the price of a STRIP is a convex function of both its
yield and time to maturity.
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the difference between the yieldson the shorter and longer securities involved in the exchange.  It
does not appear that Treasury, or its agent, would have to maintain unreasonably close contact
with evolving market conditions to price an exchange with acceptable accuracy.  Thus, it would
not be impractical for Treasury to announce a schedule of yields on single-payment securities at
the end of the day, and to receive requests for exchanges pursuant to that schedule up to the
opening of the market the following morning.
The proposed exchange facility would bound very short-range irregularities in the
structure of yields on single-payment securities such as those described in the introduction to this
section.  The market yield on a single-payment security could never differ by more than the
exchange fee from the average of the market yields on a pair of shorter and longer term single-
payment securities for which it can be exchanged.  Thus, for example, the market yield on a
November, 2006 STRIP would have to be in the interval from 5.98% to 6.03% if the market
yields on the August, 2006 and February, 2007 STRIPS were 5.99% and 6.02%, respectively.
Limiting Exchanges to “Nearby” Securities. To preclude the possibility that the
exchange facility might do more than bound short-range irregularities in the structure of yields on
single-payment securities, the difference between the maturities of the longer and shorter
securities that can be exchanged for an intermediate maturity security should be limited, possibly
as suggested in Table 7.  Appendix B discusses the implications of the limitations in Table 7 for
the shape of the yield curve in more detail.61
Other Limitations.  In addition to limitations like those in Table 7, it may be desirable to
                                         
61 In the absence of limitations like those prescribed in Table 7, the exchange facility would
result in an equilibrium where the yield on any single-payment security could not differ from
the average of the yields on a pair of shorter and longer term single-payment securities by
more than the exchange fee.  If positive amounts of single-payment securities of all maturities
remained outstanding, the yield on a single-payment security would be very nearly a linear
function of its time to maturity.  This issue is discussed further in Appendix B.
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limit the maximum increase or decrease in the amount payable on a given date to prevent the
development of large variations in rollover financing requirements.  This cap would be similar to
the cap on reconstitution discussed in Section 4, but it would here limit the increase or decrease in
aggregate Treasury liabilities payable on a given date, rather than the principal amount of a note
or bond that can be created by reconstituting STRIPS derived from other securities.
To facilitate Treasury planning for rollover financings, it may also be desirable to prohibit
exchanges involving any security with less than a month or six weeks remaining to maturity.
Benefits of the Proposal
We believe the proposed exchange facility would enhance the liquidity of STRIPS and off-
the-run Treasury notes and bonds, and would increase the integration of the bill market with the
markets for short-term STRIPS and coupon-bearing securities.
Liquidity Enhancement.  The proposal would improve the substitutability of
substantially similar single-payment securities by limiting the range of relative variation of yields
on securities with very nearly identical payment characteristics.  This can have important
consequences for the liquidity of Treasury securities.
For example, a dealer could satisfy a customer’s interest in purchasing $10 million face
amount of a STRIP that the dealer did not already own by selling the STRIP short, and then
hedging the risk of loss on the short sale (to not more than twice the exchange fee) by purchasing
$5 million each of a somewhat shorter STRIP and a somewhat longer STRIP.62  W  believe that
limiting basis risk on hedged short sales will lead to a more liquid STRIPS market with narrower
                                         
62 The maximum loss of twice the exchange fee would occur if the dealer sold the intermediate
STRIP short at a yield close to the average yield on the shorter and longer STRIPS p us the
fee, and then liquidated the hedged short position when the yield on the intermediate STRIP
was close to the average yield on the shorter and longer STRIPS minus the fee.  The
maximum loss will be smaller the smaller the difference between (a) the yield at which the
intermediate STRIP is sold short and (b) the average yield on the shorter and longer STRIPS.
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bid-ask spreads.  Similar comments apply to the markets for notes and bonds, because those
securities are linked to STRIPS through stripping and reconstitution.
Market Integration.  The proposal would also lead to a sharp reduction in the yield
spread between STRIPS and bills, as well as between short-term coupon-bearing securities and
bills.
Large spreads between yields on STRIPS and yields on bills of a similar maturity can not
persist if - as illustrated in Example 4 - market participants can exchange (for a modest fee)
$2,000 face amount of a STRIP maturing on November 15, 1999 for $1,000 face amount each of
bills maturing on November 12 and November 18, 1999.  The exchange facility would greatly
enhance the integration of the (relatively illiquid) markets for short-term STRIPS and coupon-
bearing securities with the (much more liquid) bill market.  In particular, the spread between the
yield on a short-term note or bond and the yield on a bill with a similar maturity would be limited
to not more than the prescribed exchange fee (2-1/2 basis points in the foregoing example).  The
prospect of improved liquidity and higher prices in the markets for short-term coupon-bearing
securities would, in turn, enhance the liquidity and value of intermediate-term securities and
consequently lower the cost of funding the federal debt.
Enhanced integration of the markets for short-term STRIPS and bills would not
necessarily lead to exchanges of STRIPS for bills on a wholesale basis.  Since positions in short-
term STRIPS could be priced and hedged more reliably with bills of a comparable maturity (see
text at footnote 62), the superior liquidity of the bill market would spill over into the STRIPS
market, making STRIPS more valuable and reducing the economic incentive for any actual
exchange.63  Phrased another way, the stated willingness of Treasury to exchange bills for
STRIPS at a modest fee would itself limit the incidence of such exchanges.
                                         
63 Liquidity spillovers are discussed in Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997, pp. 378 -
380).  See also the related analysis in Amihud and Mendelson (1996, pp. 1455 - 1464).
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Other Benefits.  The proposed exchange facility would allow market conditions to
influence, within limits prescribed by Treasury, the amount of Treasury debt maturing on different
dates.  In contrast to present debt management practices, the amount payable on a particularly
desirable date, such as the end of a calendar quarter, could expand in response to market demand,
while the amounts payable on nearby dates contract dollar-for-dollar.
Our proposal can be viewed as a market-driven substitute for tactical variations in primary
market offerings in response to unusually strong investor demand for particular maturities.  It is
analogous to the philosophy that motivated the 1985 decision of Treasury to facilitate bond
stripping rather than to issue zero-coupon securities itself:
The investment community will be better able [than Treasury] to offer zero-coupon
instruments that meet particular needs in a timely manner.  The market for zero-coupon
securities is a rapidly changing one.  The demand varies substantially for particular
maturities and with changes in interest rates and in the needs of various investor classes…
This changing demand for zeros will be best accommodated by the STRIPS program of
making a broad range of maturities eligible for stripping but leav it to the market to
decide when and how much of an issue it will separate and market as zero-coupon
instruments.64  [Emphasis added.]
As a related matter, by partially endogenizing the face amount of single-payment securities
maturing on a particular date, the exchange facility - taken in conjunction with the proposal in
Section 4 and the existing provision for reconstituting STRIPS into coupon-bearing securities -
would provide another mechanism for expanding the supply of a security on special in the
financing market for specific collateral.  Additionally, the supply of a new, on-the-run, issue could
increase beyond the original issue amount in response to demand for the security, and then
contract as the security migrated from on-the-run to off-the-run status.
And last, but not least, the revenue generated by the exchange fee would benefit directly
Treasury’s objective of minimizing the cost of funding the federal debt.
                                         
64 “Treasury Announces New STRIPS Program,” T easury News, January 15, 1985.
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A Precedent for the Proposal
The proposed exchange facility is novel, but it is not without precedent.
Each Foreign-Targeted Treasury Note sold in the mid-1980s (see footnote 33 above) was
exchangeable (throughout its life) for an equal principal amount of a conventional note with the
same coupon rate and maturity date.65 (Conventional notes issued in exchange for Foreign-
Targeted notes increased the amount outstanding of a note originally sold contemporaneously
with the Foreign-Targeted note.)  Depending on when an exchange was made, a market
participant electing to exchange a Foreign-Targeted note made a cash payment to Treasury or
received a cash payment from Treasury.  The payment accounted for the difference in value
between annual payment of interest on the Foreign-Targeted note and semi-annual payment of
interest on the conventional note.
Thus, it is not unprecedented for Treasury to issue additional amounts of an outstanding
security, in exchange for a different security, in a transaction that results in a change in the timing
of its future liabilities (but leaves the aggregate quantity of liabilities unchanged) and that involves
a cash payment to account for the present value of the change in the timing of the future
liabilities.66
A Trial
We are not unaware that the proposed exchange facility may be viewed by some as a risky
policy initiative.  Therefore, we suggest the possibility of a limited trial.
Treasury could adopt the facility, but limit its initial availability to bills and STRIPS with
less than one year to maturity.  If the program is deemed useful and in the public interest, it could
be extended to securities with longer maturities.  If, on the other hand, experience indicates that
                                         
65 See footnote 35 for an example of the use of the exchange option by market participants.
66 The exchange facility may also be analogized to a “tap,” or continuing, offering of new
securities (in this case, single-payment securities), where payment is made largely with other
securities - rather than with cash only.
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the program is ineffective or has unforeseen adverse consequences, the program could be
terminated.  The subsequent passage of time and redemption of debt would eradicate its effects
within a year.67
7. Conclusion
The starting point for this paper is the belief that reducing limitations on the fungibility and
substitutability of Treasury securities can enhance liquidity and lead to higher prices for those
securities.68
We discussed three ways to expand the fungibility of identical cash flows and the
substitutability of nearly identical liabilities.  The fungibility of identical cash flows can be
enhanced by allowing market participants who reconstitute STRIPS to substitute interest
payments and principal payments due on the same date.  Aligning the maturity dates of 2-year
debt with either the maturity dates of bills or the maturity dates of longer-term debt would also
reduce heterogeneity and enhance fungibility.  The third proposal, to establish an exchange
facility, would directly enhance the substitutability of Treasury securities with nearly identical cash
flows.
The market environment created by traders executing arbitrage and relative value
transactions in light of expanded opportunities for reconstitution and exchange would
complement efforts to maintain liquidity through buybacks of old issues and expanded offerings of
new issues. The enhanced liquidity and market integration associated with improved
substitutability and fungibility would increase demand and reduce the cost of funding the debt.
Allowing the supply of a security to expand beyond its original issue size would provide for some
                                         
67 The authors are grateful to Yakov Amihud for suggesting such a trial.
68 Liquidity (and security prices) can also be enhanced by improving the microstructure of a
market.  See, for example, Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997).  Amihud and
Mendelson (1996) suggest that an issuer should have a property right to determine the
market or markets in which its securities are traded as a way to incentivize he innovation of
liquidity-enhancing market microstructures.
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elasticity in the supply of on-the-run securities and reduce the risk of a squeeze.  More generally,
greater liquidity and market integration, reduced scarcity risk, and elasticity in the supply of on-
the-run debt would help ensure the continued attractiveness of Treasury securities for investing,
trading and hedging in an era of surpluses.
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Appendix A.Sensitivity of the Cash Payment on an Exchange to the Yields on the Shorter
and Longer Securities
This appendix examines whether the size of the cash payment to Treasury resulting from
an exchange like that proposed in Section 6 is sensitive to the yields used to value the obligations
exchanged.  In particular, do small changes in the yields on the shorter and longer securities result
in very different cash payments, so that Treasury, or its agent, would have to maintain close
contact with evolving market conditions to price an exchange with reasonable accuracy?
Example A1 examines the same exchange as in Example 2, but prices the shorter and
longer STRIPS (and hence the intermediate STRIP) at yields that are 10 basis points lower than
the yields in Example 2.  The cash payment to Treasury is $2.29; a difference of less than 1%
from the $2.27 payment calculated in Example 2.
Example A2 also examines the same exchange as in Example 2, but in this case using a
yield for pricing the shorter STRIP that is 5 basis points lower than the yield in Example 2 and a
yield for pricing the longer STRIP that is 5 basis points h gher than the yield in Example 2.  The
cash payment to Treasury is $2.34; a difference of a bit more than 3% from the $2.27 payment
calculated in Example 2.
We conclude that the payment to Treasury is relatively insensitive to moderate variations
in (a) the levels of the yields and (b) the difference between the yields on the securities involved in
the exchange.
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Appendix B.Implications of the Exchange Facility for the Shape of the Yield Curve
We observed in Section 6 that the proposed exchange facility would bound short-range
irregularities in the structure of yields on single-payment securities.  The yield on a single-payment
security could never differ by more than the prescribed exchange fee from the average of the
yields on a pair of shorter and longer term single-payment securities for which it can be
exchanged.
To preclude the possibility that the exchange facility might affect the over-all shape of the
yield curve, we suggested that the difference between the maturities of the longer and shorter
securities that can be exchanged for an intermediate maturity security should be limited as shown
in Table 7.  The limitations are important because if market participants can, without limitation,
exchange short-term, e.g., 1-year, STRIPS and long-term, e.g., 25-year, STRIPS for
intermediate-term, e.g., 13-year, STRIPS, and vice versa, at an exchange fee of, for example, 2 or
3 basis points, then (in an equilibrium where positive amounts of short-, intermediate-, and long-
term STRIPS remain outstanding) the STRIPS yield curve would have to be very close to a
straight (but not necessarily flat) line.
The limitations in Table 7 will not preclude indirect exchanges of much longer and much
shorter securities for an intermediate maturity security, but such indirect exchanges will be
prohibitively expensive.  We show in this appendix how two STRIPS maturing a year apart could
be exchanged for an intermediate maturity STRIP maturing in more than 2 years by combining
three exchanges permitted by Table 7, and we also show that the triplet of exchanges is equivalent
to a direct exchange for a fee four times larger than the fee prescribed for an exchange that falls
within the limitations in Table 7.  We conclude that the rapidly escalating costs of more dispersed,
indirect, exchanges will, as a practical matter, preclude such exchanges and that the exchange
facility can be structured to avoid affecting the over-all shape of the yield curve.
Combining Three Exchanges to Effect an Exchange That Can Not be Done Directly
Suppose the fee on an exchange that falls within the limitations in Table 7 is 2-1/2 basis
36
points.  Using the yields on Interest Component STRIPS on July 22, 1999 from Table 3, we
demonstrate how a market participant could indirectly effect an exchange of $1,000 face amount
of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2006 and $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing a year later, on
May 15, 2007, for $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006, for a fee of
about 10 basis points.  (Note that this exchange can not be done directly for a fee of 2-1/2 basis
points, because the difference in the maturities of the shorter and longer STRIPS exceeds the
limits in Table 7.)
Exchange 1.  Consider first the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 5.97% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006, quoted on July 22,
1999 at a yield of 5.96% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 66.98146% of face value,69 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 65.08622% of face value.70  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.940% (5.940% = ½ of 5.97% and 5.96%, minus
2-1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 66.13553% of face value.71
                                         
69 66.98146 = )184/11513(2
1 )0597.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 13 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
70 65.08622 = )184/11514(2
1 )0596.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity.
71 66.13553 = )181/2314(2
1 )0594.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 14 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
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The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $2.0338,
computed as:
· 66.13553% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
· 66.98146% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 65.08622% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
Exchange 2.  Consider next the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006, quoted on July 22,
1999 at a yield of 5.96% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 6.03% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 65.08622% of face value,72 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 62.86808% of face value.73  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.970% (5.970% = ½ of 5.96% and 6.03%, minus
2-1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 64.08659% of face value.74
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange is $2.1888, computed as:
· 64.08659% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
                                         
72 65.08622 = )184/11514(2
1 )0596.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 13 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
73 62.86808 = )184/11515(2
1 )0603.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 15 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity.
74 64.08659 = )181/2315(2
1 )0597.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 15 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
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· 65.08622% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 62.86808% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
Exchange 3.  Finally, consider the exchange of:
a) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at
a yield of 5.99% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999
at a yield of 6.02% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $4,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
From the calculations in Example 2, the net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange is
$4.5374 ($4.5374 = 2 times $2.2687).
Summary.  The net effect of the three exchanges is an exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 5.97% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 6.03% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
The total payment due Treasury at the time of the composite exchange is $8.7600, computed as:
· $2.0338 for $1,000 face amount of the May, 2006 STRIP and $1,000 face amount of
the November, 2006 STRIP exchanged for $2,000 face amount of the August, 2006
STRIP,
· $2.1888 for $1,000 face amount of the November, 2006 STRIP and $1,000 face
amount of the May, 2007 STRIP exchanged for $2,000 face amount of the February,
2007 STRIP, and
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· $4.5374 for $2,000 face amount of the August, 2006 STRIP and $2,000 face amount
of the February, 2007 STRIP exchanged for $4,000 face amount of the November,
2006 STRIP.
Example B1 shows that this combination of exchanges is essentially equivalent to a direct
exchange of $1,000 face amount of the May, 2006 STRIP and $1,000 face amount of the May,
2007 STRIP for $2,000 face amount of the November, 2006 STRIP at an exchange fee of 10
basis points, or four times the 2-1/2 basis point fee for an exchange that falls within the limitations
in Table 7.
The foregoing calculation implies that the proposed exchange facility would bound the
yield on a single-payment security maturing in more than two years to a range of about ± 10 basis
points around the average yield on a pair of single-payment securities maturing 6 months earlier
and 6 months later.  Similar calculations show that if the shorter and longer securities mature 18
months apart, then the range around the average yield is about ± 22-1/2 asis points.  If the
shorter and longer securities mature 2 years apart, then the range around the average yield is
about ± 40 basis points.  If the securities mature 3 years apart, the range is about ± 90 ba is
points, and if the securities mature 4 years apart the range is about ± 160 basis points.75
These bands are so wide that it is unlikely that the curvature of the yield curve will be
large enough to induce market participants to undertake indirect exchanges of securities maturing
more than 6 months apart for an intermediate-term security maturing in more than 2 years, and
hence unlikely that the proposed exchange facility will have any effect on the overall shape of the
yield curve beyond two years.  Since the limits in Table 7 shrink with the maturity of the
intermediate security in an exchange, similar conclusions apply to the front end of the curve as
                                         
75 It can be shown that the magnitude of the range is twice the exchange fee, times the square of
the number of half years between the maturities of the shorter and longer STRIPS.  For
example, if the fee is 2-1/2 basis points and the shorter and longer STRIPS mature 2 years
apart, the magnitude of the range is 80 basis points (80 = 2 times 2-1/2 times 42, where 2
years is equivalent to 4 half-years).
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well.
If, on further examination, the bounds on the curvature of the yield curve described above
appear to be too tight, the bounds can be expanded by raising the exchange fee.  For example,
raising the fee from 2-1/2 basis points to 3-1/2 basis points would expand the band on the yield on
a single-payment security around the average yield on a pair of single-payment securities maturing
6 months earlier and 6 months later from 10 basis points to 14 basis points.  Similarly, the band
around the average yield on a pair of single-payment securities maturing 1 year earlier and 1 year
later would expand from 40 basis points to 56 basis points.
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Table 1. 10-year Note and 30-year Bond Offerings in the Quarterly Financing
Auctions, 1990 to 1999 (reopenings in boldface)
10-year Note 30-year Bond
1990 Feb 8-1/2% of Feb 15, 20008-1/2% of Feb 15, 2020
May 8-7/8% of May 15, 20008-3/4% of May 15, 2020
Aug 8-3/4% of Aug 15, 20008-3/4% of Aug 15, 2020
Nov 8-1/2% of Nov 15, 20008-3/4% of Aug 15, 2020
1991 Feb 7-3/4% of Feb 15, 20017-7/8% of Feb 15, 2021
May 8% of May 15, 2001 8-1/8% of May 15, 2021
Aug 7-7/8% of Aug 15, 20018-1/8% of Aug 15, 2021
Nov 7-1/2% of Nov 15, 20018% of Nov 15, 2021
1992 Feb 7-1/2% of Nov 15, 20018% of Nov 15, 2021
May 7-1/2% of May 15, 20028% of Nov 15, 2021
Aug 6-3/8% of Aug 15, 20027-1/4% of Aug 15, 2022
Nov 6-3/8% of Aug 15, 20027-5/8% of Nov 15, 2022
1993 Feb 6-1/4% of Feb 15, 20037-1/8% of Feb 15, 2023
May 6-1/4% of Feb 15, 20037-1/8% of Feb 15, 2023
Aug 5-3/4% of Aug 15, 20036-1/4% of Aug 15, 2023
Nov 5-3/4% of Aug 15, 2003not offered
1994 Feb 5-7/8% of Feb 15, 20046-1/4% of Aug 15, 2023
May 7-1/4% of May 15, 2004not offered
Aug 7-1/4% of Aug 15, 20047-1/2% of Nov 15, 2024 a
Nov 7-7/8% of Nov 15, 2004not offered
a. 30-1/4-year bond, see footnote 21 to text.
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Table 1. (continued)
10-year Note 30-year Bond
1995 Feb 7-1/2% of Feb 15, 20057-5/8% of Feb 15, 2025
May 6-1/2% of May 15, 2005not offered
Aug 6-1/2% of Aug 15, 20056-7/8% of Aug 15, 2025
Nov 5-7/8% of Nov 15, 2005not offered
1996 Feb 5-5/8% of Feb 15, 20066% of Feb 15, 2026
May 6-7/8% of May 15, 2006not offered
Aug 7% of Jul 15, 2006 b 6-3/4% of Aug 15, 2026
Nov 6-1/2% of Oct 15, 2006 c 6-1/4% of Nov 15, 2026
1997 Feb 6-1/4% of Feb 15, 20076-5/8% of Feb 15, 2027
May 6-5/8% of May 15, 2007not offered
Aug 6-1/8% of Aug 15, 20076-3/8% of Aug 15, 2027
Nov 6-1/8% of Aug 15, 20076-1/8% of Nov 15, 2027
1998 Feb 5-1/2% of Feb 15, 20086-1/8% of Nov 15, 2027
May 5-5/8% of May 15, 2008not offered
Aug 5-5/8% of May 15, 20085-1/2% of Aug 15, 2028
Nov 4-3/4% of Nov 15, 20085-1/4% of Nov 15, 2028
1999 Feb 4-3/4% of Nov 15, 20085-1/4% of Feb 15, 2029
May 5-1/2% of May 15, 2009not offered
Aug 6% of Aug 15, 2009 6-1/8% of Aug 15, 2029
Nov 6% of Aug 15, 2009 not offered
b. Reopening of a 10-year note first offered in July, 1996.
c. Reopening of a 10-year note first offered in October, 1996.
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Table 2. Inflation-Indexed Securities (reopenings in boldface)
Auction date Description Issue size and date
Jan 29, 1997 3-3/8% of Jan 15, 2007$7.7 billion on Feb 6, 1997
Apr 8, 1997 3-3/8% of Jan 15, 2007$8.4 billion on Apr 15, 1997
Jul 9, 1997 3-5/8% of Jul 15, 2002$8.4 billion on Jul 15, 1997
Oct 8, 1997 3-5/8% of Jul 15, 2002$8.4 billion on Oct 15, 1997
Jan 8, 1998 3-5/8% of Jan 15, 2008$8.4 billion on Jan 15, 1998
Apr 8, 1998 3-5/8% of Apr 15, 2028$8.4 billion on Apr 15, 1998
Jul 8, 1998 3-5/8% of Apr 15, 2028$8.4 billion on Jul 15, 1998
Oct 7, 1998 3-5/8% of Jan 15, 2008$8.4 billion on Oct 15, 1998
Jan 6, 1999 3-7/8% of Jan 15, 2009$8.5 billion on Jan 15, 1999
Apr 7, 1999 3-7/8% of Apr 15, 2029$7.4 billion on Apr 15, 1999
Jul 7, 1999 3-7/8% of Jan 15, 2009$7.4 billion on Jul 15, 1999
Oct 6, 1999 3-7/8% of Apr 15, 2029$7.4 billion on Oct 15, 1999
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Feb 15, 2004 5.80% 5.69% na
May 15 5.82 5.75 na
Aug 15 5.79 5.78 na
Nov 15 5.86 5.81 5.89%
Feb 15, 2005 5.91 5.84 na
May 15 5.93 5.83 5.95
Aug 15 5.95 5.86 5.97
Nov 15 5.93 5.86 na
Feb 15, 2006 5.96 5.86 5.91
May 15 5.97 na na
Aug 15 5.99 na na
Nov 15 5.96 na na
Feb 15, 2007 6.02 na na
May 15 6.03 na na
Aug 15 6.03 na na
Nov 15 6.00 na na
Feb 15, 2008 6.09 na na
May 15 6.11 na na
Aug 15 6.12 na na
Nov 15 6.13 na na
Feb 15, 2009 6.14 na na
May 15 6.16 na na
Aug 15 6.16 na na
Nov 15 6.17 na 6.27 (callable)
Feb 15, 2010 6.19 na na
May 15 6.20 na na
Aug 15 6.21 na na
Nov 15 6.22 na na
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Table 4. Principal Amount Outstanding and Maximum Additional Amount that
Could be Reconstituted from the Principal and Interest Liabilities in Figure
5, Treasury Notes and Non-callable Bonds Maturing in Mid-quarter, as of
October 6, 1999
                                                                    Principal Maximum  Maximum
                                                                    Amount Additional  Additional
Amount,
Original  Coupon      Maturity         Outstanding,Amount,  as a Percent of
Term       Rate Date         $ billions $ billions  Outstanding
10-yr 7.875 Nov 15, 1999 10.77 17.13 159.0
10-yr 8.500 Feb 15, 2000 10.67 20.94 196.3
10-yr 8.875 May 15, 2000 10.50 16.61 158.2
10-yr 8.750 Aug 15, 2000 11.08 20.45 184.5
10-yr 8.500 Nov 15, 2000 11.52 31.55 273.9
  3-yr 5.750 Nov 15, 2000 16.04 27.61 172.2
10-yr 7.750 Feb 15, 2001 11.31 34.92 308.6
  3-yr 5.375 Feb 15, 2001 15.37 31.40 204.3
10-yr 8.000 May 15, 2001 12.40 27.66 223.1
  3-yr 5.625 May 15, 2001 12.87 27.65 214.8
10-yr 7.875 Aug 15, 2001 12.34 19.25 156.0
10-yr 7.500 Nov 15, 2001 24.23 14.10 58.2
10-yr 7.500 May 15, 2002 11.71 13.67 116.7
10-yr 6.375 Aug 15, 2002 23.86 18.65 78.2
10-yr 6.250 Feb 15, 2003 23.56 17.95 76.2
10-yr 5.750 Aug 15, 2003 28.01 36.50 130.3
  5-yr 5.250 Aug 15, 2003 19.85 44.82 225.8
  5-yr 4.250 Nov 15, 2003 18.63 13.50 72.5
10-yr 5.875 Feb 15, 2004 12.96 33.27 256.8
  5-yr 4.750 Feb 15, 2004 17.82 28.66 160.8
10-yr 7.250 May 15, 2004 14.44 31.07 215.1
  5-yr 5.250 May 15, 2004 18.93 27.03 142.8
10-yr 7.250 Aug 15, 2004 13.35 32.43 243.0
  5-yr 6.000 Aug 15, 2004 18.09 27.97 154.6
20-yr 11.625 Nov 15, 2004 8.30 25.20 303.5
10-yr 7.875 Nov 15, 2004 14.37 19.73 137.3
10-yr 7.500 Feb 15, 2005 13.84 13.94 100.7
20-yr 12.000 May 15, 2005 4.26 24.72 580.2
10-yr 6.500 May 15, 2005 14.74 15.02 101.9
20-yr 10.750 Aug 15, 2005 9.27 27.49 296.5
10-yr 6.500 Aug 15, 2005 15.00 22.51 150.0
10-yr 5.875 Nov 15, 2005 15.21 10.24 67.3
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Table 4. (continued)
                                                                    Principal Maximum  Maximum
                                                                    Amount Additional  Additional
Amount,
Original  Coupon      Maturity         Outstanding,Amount,  as a Percent of
Term       Rate Date         $ billions $ billions  Outstanding
20-yr 9.375 Feb 15, 2006 4.76 27.83 585.2
10-yr 5.625 Feb 15, 2006 15.51 17.67 113.9
10-yr 6.875 May 15, 2006 16.02 9.66 60.3
10-yr 6.250 Feb 15, 2007 13.10 12.39 94.5
10-yr 6.625 May 15, 2007 13.96 9.22 66.1
10-yr 6.125 Aug 15, 2007 25.64 11.63 45.4
10-yr 5.500 Feb 15, 2008 13.58 11.31 83.2
10-yr 5.625 May 15, 2008 27.19 8.52 31.3
10-yr 4.750 Nov 15, 2008 25.08 7.98 31.8
10-yr 5.500 May 15, 2009 14.79 7.55 51.1
10-yr 6.000 Aug 15, 2009 14.76 10.85 73.5
30-yr 11.250 Feb 15, 2015 12.67 9.91 78.2
30-yr 10.625 Aug 15, 2015 7.15 9.57 133.9
30-yr 9.875 Nov 15, 2015 6.90 7.07 102.5
30-yr 9.250 Feb 15, 2016 7.27 9.32 128.2
30-yr 7.250 May 15, 2016 18.82 6.50 34.5
30-yr 7.500 Nov 15, 2016 18.86 5.81 30.8
30-yr 8.750 May 15, 2017 18.19 5.02 27.6
30-yr 8.875 Aug 15, 2017 14.02 8.74 62.3
30-yr 9.125 May 15, 2018 8.71 4.63 53.1
30-yr 9.000 Nov 15, 2018 9.03 4.24 46.9
30-yr 8.875 Feb 15, 2019 19.25 7.92 41.1
30-yr 8.125 Aug 15, 2019 20.21 7.16 35.4
30-yr 8.500 Feb 15, 2020 10.23 6.73 65.8
30-yr 8.750 May 15, 2020 10.16 3.82 37.6
30-yr 8.750 Aug 15, 2020 21.42 5.82 27.2
30-yr 7.875 Feb 15, 2021 11.11 5.43 48.8
30-yr 8.125 May 15, 2021 11.96 3.36 28.1
30-yr 8.125 Aug 15, 2021 12.16 4.94 40.7
30-yr 8.000 Nov 15, 2021 32.80 2.10 6.4
30-yr 7.250 Aug 15, 2022 10.35 4.60 44.5
30-yr 7.625 Nov 15, 2022 10.70 1.72 16.0
30-yr 7.125 Feb 15, 2023 18.37 3.97 21.6
30-yr 6.250 Aug 15, 2023 22.91 3.30 14.4
30-yr 7.500 Nov 15, 2024 11.47 1.30 11.3
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Table 4. (continued)
                                                                    Principal Maximum  Maximum
                                                                    Amount Additional  Additional
Amount,
Original  Coupon      Maturity         Outstanding,Amount,  as a Percent of
Term       Rate Date         $ billions $ billions  Outstanding
30-yr 6.750 Aug 15, 2026 10.89 1.71 15.7
30-yr 6.500 Nov 15, 2026 11.49 0.95 8.2
30-yr 6.625 Feb 15, 2027 10.46 1.37 13.1
30-yr 6.375 Aug 15, 2027 10.74 1.04 9.7
30-yr 6.125 Nov 15, 2027 22.52 0.28 1.2
30-yr 5.500 Aug 15, 2028 11.78 0.73 6.2
30-yr 5.250 Nov 15, 2028 10.95 0.00 0.0
30-yr 5.250 Feb 15, 2029 11.35 0.33 2.9
30-yr 6.125 Aug 15, 2029 11.18 0.00 0.0
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Table 5. Number of New Treasury Securities Offered, fiscal year, excluding
reopenings
Oct 1, 1984 -
Sep 30, 1985
Oct 1, 1991 -
Sep 30, 1992
Oct 1, 1998 -
Sep 30, 1999
Bills
Cash management 0 0 6
26-week 39 38 40
52-week 13 13 13
Sub-total 52 51 59
Conventional Notes and Bonds
2-year 13 12 12
3-year 4 4 0
4-year 4 0 0
5-year 4 12 4
7-year 4 4 0
10-year 4 3 3
20-year 3 0 0
30-year 3 2 3
Sub-total 39 37 22
Foreign-Targeted Notes
4-year 1 0 0
5-year 2 0 0
10-year 0 0 0
Sub-total 3 0 0
Inflation-Indexed Notes and Bonds
5-year 0 0 0
10-year 0 0 1
30-year 0 0 1
Sub-total 0 0 2
Total 94 88 83
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Table 6. Treasury Bill Yields on July 22, 1999
Maturity Date Discount Rate Yield
Jul 29, 1999 3.96% 4.02%
Aug 5 4.24 4.31
Aug 12 4.33 4.40
Aug 19 4.33 4.40
Aug 26 4.32 4.40
Sep 2 4.39 4.47
Sep 9 4.38 4.47
Sep 16 4.37 4.46
Sep 23 4.39 4.48
Sep 30 4.33 4.43
Oct 7 4.41 4.51
Oct 14 4.44 4.55
Oct 21 4.46 4.57
Oct 28 4.47 4.59
Nov 4 4.50 4.62
Nov 12 4.51 4.64
Nov 18 4.50 4.63
Nov 26 4.50 4.64
Dec 2 4.51 4.65
Dec 9 4.54 4.69
Dec 16 4.55 4.70
Dec 23 4.56 4.71
Dec 30 4.50 4.66
Jan 6, 2000 4.44 4.60
Jan 13 4.44 4.60
Jan 20 4.46 4.63
Jan 27 4.51 4.68
Feb 3 4.41 4.57
Mar 2 4.51 4.68
Mar 30 4.51 4.69
Apr 27 4.54 4.73
May 25 4.59 4.80
Jun 22 4.66 4.88
Jul 20 4.71 4.95
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Table 7. Suggested Limitations on Exchanges of Single-payment Securities
If the intermediate maturity
security in a proposed exchange
has a remaining term to maturity
of less than…
…then the difference between the maturities of the
shorter and longer securities that can be exchanged
for the intermediate maturity security should be no
more than …
13 weeks 2 weeks
26 weeks 4 weeks
52 weeks 6 weeks
2 years 4 months
longer than 2 years 6 months
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Example 1. Converting a Higher Coupon Security into a Lower Coupon Security and
STRIPS
This example describes how a market participant could convert $1.6 million principal value of the
11-5/8% bond of November 15, 2004 into (a) $1.6 million principal value of the 7-7/8% note of
November 15, 2004 and (b) a portfolio of STRIPS, with a face amount of $30,000 each, payable
every six months until and including May 15, 2004.
Following the interest payment on November 15, 1999, $1,600,000 principal amount of
the 11-5/8% bond of November 15, 2004 promised to pay $93,000 interest every six months from
May 15, 2000 to November 15, 2004, inclusive, and to repay principal of $1,600,000 at maturity.
Assuming that all STRIPS maturing on the same date are fungible, $1,600,000 principal amount
of the 11-5/8% bond could be stripped into nine STRIPS with a face amount of $93,000 each,
payable every six months from May 15, 2000 to May 15, 2004, inclusive, and a tenth STRIP with
a face amount of $1,693,000, payable on November 15, 2004.
Also following the interest payment on November 15, 1999, $1,600,000 principal amount
of the 7-7/8% note of November 15, 2004 promised to pay $63,000 interest every six months
from May 15, 2000 to November 15, 2004, inclusive, and to repay principal of $1,600,000 at
maturity.
It follows that $1,600,000 principal amount of the 7-7/8% note could be reconstituted
from the STRIPS derived from the 11-5/8% bond, and that ten STRIPS, with a face amount of
$30,000 each, payable every six months from May 15, 2000 to November 15, 2004, inclusive,
would remain outstanding.
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Example 2. Exchange of Shorter and Longer Maturity STRIPS for an Intermediate
Maturity
Consider the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at
a yield of 5.99% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999
at a yield of 6.02% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 65.90911% of face value,76 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 63.85172% of face value.77  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.98% (5.98% = ½ of 5.99% and 6.02%, minus 2-
1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 64.99385% of face value.78
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $2.2687,
computed as:
· 64.99385% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
· 65.90911% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 63.85172% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
                                         
76 65.90911 = )181/2314(2
1 )0599.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 14 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
77 63.85172 = )181/2315(2
1 )0602.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 15 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity.
78 64.99385 = )184/11514(2
1 )0598.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
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Example 3. Exchange of an Intermediate Maturity STRIP for Shorter and Longer
Maturities
Consider the exchange of:
a) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006,
for
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at
a yield of 5.99% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
c) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999
at a yield of 6.02% for settlement on July 23, 1999.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 65.90911% of face value,79 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 63.85172% of face value.80  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 6.03% (6.03% = ½ of 5.99% and 6.02%, plus 2-1/2
basis points) or at an invoice price of 64.76355% of face value.81
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $2.3373,
computed as:
· 65.90911% of $1,000 for the shorter obligation, plus
· 63.85172% of $1,000 for the longer obligation, less
· 64.76355% of $2,000 credit for the intermediate obligation.
                                         
79 65.90911 = )181/2314(2
1 )0599.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 14 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
80 63.85172 = )181/2315(2
1 )0602.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 15 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity.
81 64.76355 = )184/11514(2
1 )0603.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
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 Example 4. Exchange of an Intermediate Maturity STRIP for Shorter and Longer Bills
Consider the exchange of:
a) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 1999,
for
b) $1,000 face amount of bills maturing November 12, 1999, quoted on July 22, 1999 at
a discount rate of 4.51% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
c) $1,000 face amount of bills maturing November 18, 1999, quoted on July 22, 1999 at
a discount rate of 4.50% for settlement on July 23, 1999.
The shorter bill has a yield of 4.638% and an invoice price of 98.59689% of face value,82 and the
longer bill has a yield of 4.631% and an invoice price of 98.52500% of face value.83 For purposes
of the exchange, the intermediate STRIP is valued at a yield of 4.660% (4.660% = ½ of 4.638%
and 4.631%, plus 2-1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 98.53322% of face value.84
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $.1583,
computed as:
· 98.59689% of $1,000 for the shorter bill, plus
· 98.52500% of $1,000 for the longer bill, less
· 98.55303% of $2,000 credit for the intermediate STRIP.
                                         
82 98.59689 = 51.4100 360
112- , where the bill has 112 days remaining to maturity.  The yield is the
value of R that satisfies the equation 98.59689 = 1365
112 )R1(100 -+× , or R = .04638.
83 98.52500 = 50.4100 360
118- , where the bill has 118 days remaining to maturity.  The yield is the
value of R that satisfies the equation 98.52500 = 1365
118 )R1(100 -+× , or R = .04631.
84 98.5 303 = 1365
115 )04660.1(100 -+× , where the STRIP has 115 days remaining to maturity.
Note that, for consistency, we here relate the yield and invoice price of the STRIP using the
same equation used to relate the yield and invoice price of a bill with less than 183 days
remaining to maturity.
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Example A1.Exchange of Shorter and Longer Maturity STRIPS for an Intermediate
Maturity When the Level of Yields is 10 Basis Points Lower
Consider the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006, priced at a yield of 5.89%
for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007, priced at a yield of
5.92% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 66.36279% of face value,85 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 64.32239% of face value.86  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.88% (5.88% = ½ of 5.89% and 5.92%, minus 2-
1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 65.45708% of face value.87
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $2.2898,
computed as:
· 65.45708% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
· 66.36279% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 64.32239% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
                                         
85 66.36279 = )181/2314(2
1 )0589.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 14 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
86 64.32239 = )181/2315(2
1 )0592.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 15 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity.
87 65.45708 = )184/11514(2
1 )0588.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
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Example A2.Exchange of Shorter and Longer Maturity STRIPS for an Intermediate
Maturity When the Difference Between the Yields on the Longer and Shorter
STRIPS is 10 Basis Points Larger
Consider the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing August 15, 2006, priced at a yield of 5.94%
for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing February 15, 2007, priced at a yield of
6.07% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
The shorter obligation has an invoice price of 66.13553% of face value,88 and the longer
obligation has an invoice price of 63.61776% of face value.89  For purposes of the exchange, the
intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.98% (5.98% = ½ of 5.94% and 6.07%, minus 2-
1/2 basis points) or at an invoice price of 64.99385% of face value.90
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $2.3441,
computed as:
· 64.99385% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
· 66.13553% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 63.61776% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
                                         
88 66.13553 = )181/2314(2
1 )0594.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 14 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 181 in the semi-annual interval
from February 15, 1999 to August 15, 1999.
89 63.61776 = )181/2315(2
1 )0607.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 23 days plus 15 full semi-
annual periods remaining to maturity.
90 64.99385 = )184/11514(2
1 )0598.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
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Example B1.Exchange of Shorter and Longer Maturity STRIPS for an Intermediate
Maturity When the Exchange Fee is 10 Basis Points
Consider the exchange of:
a) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2006, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 5.97% for settlement on July 23, 1999, and
b) $1,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing May 15, 2007, quoted on July 22, 1999 at a
yield of 6.03% for settlement on July 23, 1999,
for:
c) $2,000 face amount of STRIPS maturing November 15, 2006.
when the fee for the exchange is 10 basis points.  The shorter obligation has an invoice price of
66.98146% of face value,91 and the longer obligation has an invoice price of 62.86808% of face
value.92  For purposes of the exchange, the intermediate obligation is valued at a yield of 5.90%
(5.90% = ½ of 5.97% and 6.03%, minus 10 basis points) or at an invoice price of 65.36415% of
face value.93
The net funds due Treasury at the time of the exchange on July 23, 1999 is $8.7876,
computed as:
· 65.36415% of $2,000 for the intermediate obligation, less
· 66.98146% of $1,000 credit for the shorter obligation, less
· 62.86808% of $1,000 credit for the longer obligation.
                                         
91 66.98146 = )184/11513(2
1 )0597.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 13 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity, and where there are 184 in the semi-annual
interval from May 15, 1999 to November 15, 1999.
92 62.86808 = )184/11515(2
1 )0603.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 15 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity.
93 65.36415 = )184/11514(2
1 )0590.1(.100 +-+× , where the obligation has 115 days plus 14 full
semi-annual periods remaining to maturity.
